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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
STEVEN JAY DOOLITTLE, : Case No. 20030703-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Failure to 
Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2002), and Speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1998), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). See 
Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to take a 
witness's written statement into the jury room during deliberation. 
Standard of Review: This Court ftreview[s] a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence for abuse of discretion." State v. Sloan. 2003 UT App 170,TJ9, 72 P.3d 138 
(citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994)). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant Steven Jay Doolittle's (Doolittle) argument that the trial court abused its 
discretion by allowing the jury to take the written statement into the jury room during 
deliberation is preserved at Court Record (R.) 92:28-30, 42, 71-77, 121, 151-156. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following rule is relevant to the issues on appeal. 
Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them 
the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have been 
received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in the 
opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as 
exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court 
shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are 
entitled to take notes during the trial and to have those notes 
with them during deliberations. As necessary, the court shall 
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on 
taking and using notes. 
UtahR.Crim.P. 17(1). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Doolittle was charged by information with one count of failure to respond to 
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 
(Supp. 2002); speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-
46 (1998); passing on the right, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-56 (1998); and driving on denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked license, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (2002). R. 1-3. The 
passing on the right and driving on a denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked license 
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charges were dismissed before trial. R. 14-15. 
A jury trial was conducted on April 17, 2003. R. 92. At trial, the State called 
Linda Leonhardt (Leonhardt), the owner of the vehicle Doolittle was allegedly driving. 
R. 92:11. During Leonhardt's testimony, the State presented a statement written by 
Leonhardt about the alleged incident (written statement) and instructed Leonhardt to read 
it. Id. at 29. Doolittle objected. Id, at 29. The trial court overruled Doolittle's objection 
and Leonhardt read the written statement into the record. Id_ at 29-30. The State moved 
to admit the written statement as an exhibit. Id. at 42. Doolittle objected. Id. at 42, 151-
56; see Addendum B. The trial court overruled Doolittle's objection, admitted the 
written statement, and permitted it to be published to the jury. Id. at 42, 156. The State 
also called Officers Steven Burke (Burke) and Kenneth Olsen. IcL at 44, 115. 
The trial court permitted the jury to take the written statement into the jury room 
during deliberation. IcL at 154-56. Following deliberation, the jury found Doolittle 
guilty of failure to respond to officer's signal to stop and speeding. R. 63. Doolittle was 
sentenced on August 14, 2003, to 0-5 years in prison for the failure to respond to 
officer's signal charge. R. 77. The trial court suspended this sentence and instead 
ordered Doolittle to serve 365 days in jail. Id. Doolittle was also sentenced to 90 days in 
jail for the speeding charge. Id. The trial court suspended this sentence. Id_ Doolittle 
filed notice of appeal on August 26, 2003. R. 86. Doolittle is not currently incarcerated. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 9, 2002, Burke was in the "area of 3910 South and 2200 West to do speed 
enforcement." R. 92:45. Using a laser device, Burke concluded a "blue car" was 
speeding. IcL at 51-52. Burke "stepped out into the . . . roadway and held my hand up 
for the vehicle to stop." IcL at 52-53. Burke "stepped out of the roadway" and "the car 
came to a complete stop, I said, 'Pull over' and the vehicle pulled over and stopped."1 Id 
at 56. There was "a male and a female" in the car. IcL The male had "brown hair, white 
complexion, thin build," and was driving. IcL at 57. Burke "never saw the driver from 
the front" and only saw "the right side of his face." Id. at 107. "After the car started to 
pull off the roadway," Burke "walked over to my bike, set my laser on the seat, picked up 
my ticket book and started walking towards the car." Id. at 57. Then, as he was 
approaching, "the car drove away." IdL. at 58. Burke "gave dispatch the license plate 
number of the vehicle" and learned the vehicle was registered to Leonhardt. IcL at 58-62. 
At trial, Leonhardt testified that she made a "habit" of loaning her car out. R. 
92:14. She "let about anybody that wanted to borrow it borrow it." IdL Specifically, she 
said she loaned her car to friends "quite a bit," "[p]robably daily." Id. at 35-36. 
Describing the day of the alleged incident, Leonhardt testified: 
I spent the night over at Steve's,. . . [a]nd I slept until 
approximately 1:30, and I know that to be true because my 
1
 Burke later testified that he "didn't actually see the tires quit moving, but the car 
was going slow enough that I could . . . tell them to pull over." R. 92:57. 
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mom also told me that, 'cause I called her right when I woke 
up. And . . . she asked me when I was coming home, 'cause 
she had my daughter and I told her that my car was gone. 
And she says, well, if- you know,.. . if it's not back, you 
know, by 2:00, then call me, I'll come and get you, so on. I 
said all right. 
And approximately, I would say 2:00, 2:30, Steve 
brang [sic] my car keys in to me. 
R. 92:26-27. Leonhardt reiterated this testimony several times, explaining that she 
remembered "[j]ust that I was asleep and Steve brang [sic] my keys back." Id. at 31, 37-
38. Specifically, she did not recall "giving" Doolittle her keys and could not "say that he 
was driving my car." Id at 39. Although Doolittle may have "talk[ed]" to her after 
returning the keys, she did not "recall any-any conversation at all." Id. at 31. 
Leonhardt further recalled speaking to Burke about the alleged incident around 
July 9 or 10, 2002. IcL at 15. She said she "probably" answered Burke's questions 
truthfully but she did not "remember exactly those questions right today." Id. She also 
recalled writing a statement, but did not recall that the written statement was actually 
"how it was." Id. at 30. After identifying the written statement as hers, Leonhardt 
testified reading the written statement did not refresh her "recollection about the events 
of the 9th and the 10th of July, 2002." Id at 16-17. 
The State instructed Leonhardt to read from the written statement "what Steve told 
you." Id at 27. Doolittle objected, arguing hearsay. IdL at 28. The trial court overruled 
Doolittle's objection and Leonhardt said, "I wrote that he might have mentioned almost 
getting pulled over by a cop." Id. Next, at the State's urging, Leonhardt read from the 
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written statement, "The gal that he was with wanted a . . . ride home and I asked him if he 
would run her home, it was like right around the comer. And he- he just very quickly 
answered no, Fm done driving forever." Id. Then, the State asked Leonhardt to read 
"the entirety of the statement." Id at 29. Doolittle again objected, arguing the evidence 
was "cumulative" because "we already have the relevant portions out." Id_ at 29-30. The 
trial court overruled Doolittle's objection. Id. at 30. Leonhardt read the written 
statement as follows: 
On-on May 9th of '02, about noon, I let Steve [] Doolittle 
take my car to run a friend to the store. When he returned, 
about 2:30 or so, the girl that needed a ride to the store also 
needed a ride home. I asked Steve if he would take her, since 
she is actually his friend, not mine. 
He answered me very quickly and sharply said, No, 
Fm done driving forever. I think he might have mentioned 
almost getting pulled over by a cop. I didn't ask any 
questions. 
We were at his house on Parkway Avenue, 
Chesterfield, about 1300 West. Steve is small guy with a 
long face, crook teeth, sandy blond hair, [] 34 years old. 
Id at 30. To explain why she wrote the statement, Leonhardt said, "I was probably mad 
because I should have been home already." Id. at 27. 
During its redirect examination of Leonhardt, the State moved to admit the written 
statement as an exhibit. IdL at 42. Doolittle objected, arguing Leonhardt "doesn't even 
adopt it as her statement." Id The trial court overruled Doolittle's objection and 
admitted the written statement as an exhibit. Id. At the State's request, the trial court 
permitted the written statement to be published to the jury. Id. 
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At the next recess, Doolittle renewed his objection to the admission of the written 
statement as an exhibit and moved for a mistrial. IdL. at 71. Doolittle argued, "And there 
is no question that Mr. Cope could question this witness about her prior statement. The 
Court permitted him to do that. The issue is that it was published to the jury." IcL_ at 77-
78. After the State rested, the trial court overruled Doolittle's objection and denied the 
motion for a mistrial, explaining the written statement "was read in its entirety into the 
record and then it was moved for admission and the Court granted the motion and 
permitted the exhibit to be published." Id. at 121; R. 64. 
After the jury retired to deliberate, Doolittle again renewed his objection to the 
admission of the written statement as an exhibit. R. 92:151-52. Doolittle argued neither 
the rules of evidence nor case law indicated "that the actual statement from the witness or 
memorandum from the witness that was relied upon at the trial was ever admitted." Id. at 
152-53. Doolittle then reiterated his objection to publishing the written statement to the 
jury because "it over-emphasizes that statement as being more important than anything 
else the jury heard in terms of testimony because they have it memorialized; whereas, 
every other piece of testimony is in their head." Id. at 155. 
In response, the State said, "I think the last portion of defense counsel's argument 
may have some validity and we'd have no objection to the Court retrieving [the written 
statement] from the jurors and telling them that they must rely upon their own 
recollections regarding when that was read to the jury." Id_ at 155. The State continued: 
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It seems to me appropriate for them to have seen it because it 
was testified that it was in her own handwriting, there was no 
writing upon it except hers and-well, with the exception of 
the case number, I guess; I think it's important to see what 
kind of handwriting she had, that it was deliberated and not 
hurried, not forced, but if the only objection is that it should 
not be with the jury now, we have no objection to the Court 
retrieving it from the jury. 
Id. at 155-56. The trial court again overruled Doolittle's objection, finding the written 
statement admissible and saying "if there is a question some time later, we'll let the 
appellate court review it." IcL at 156. 
Burke also testified at trial, explaining that he spoke to Leonhardt about the 
alleged incident. IcL at 65. Burke said Leonhardt told him she owned the car and 
"Steven Doolittle" had borrowed her car the "previous" day "at approximately 12:00 
[p.m.]," and returned it at "[a]bout 2:30." IcL_ at 66-67. He "provided her with a witness 
statement and asked her to detail how the car came to be lent out, how it was returned 
and any statements that were made when the car was returned." IcL at 67-68. Burke did 
not recall Leonhardt "exhibit[ing] any cognitive difficulties while she was talking . . . or 
writing up the statement." Id. at 68. 
When Burke asked Leonhardt how to locate Doolittle, Leonhardt "couldn't give 
me an exact address, but she gave me a general area and she gave me a phone number." 
Id. Next, Burke used the "Spillman" system to "pull[] up a list of S. Doolittles" with 
names and addresses. IcL at 111. He "came up with the address of 1274 West and 
Parkway" and a phone number he believed matched the number Leonhardt had given 
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him. Id at 69. Burke could not testify the number he retrieved from Spillman was the 
same number Leonhardt had given him. I<L at 69, 110. He did not have the phone 
number Leonhardt had given him "in this report," and he could not find "the notebook 
that I had that written down in." Id. 
Burke called the phone number "listed on the Spillman print-out." IcL at 92. A 
male answered and Burke identified himself and "asked for Steven Doolittle." IcL at 69, 
92. The man said "he was Steven Doolittle." IdL.at92. Burke asked the man if he "was 
driving a blue car in the area of 3910 South 2200 West," and the man "said he was." IcL 
at 92-93. Next, Burke asked the man "why he didn't stop when I flagged him over," and 
the man said "he was afraid to stop because he thought he had a warrant." Id. at 93. 
Then, Burke asked the man "if he knew that I was a police officer," and the man "said 
yes." Id. at 93. Finally, Burke asked the man "if he knew that he had pushed another 
vehicle from the—the northbound travel lane," and the man said, "The guy was trying to 
cut me off." IcL at 94-95. Burke and the man "set up a—a place and time for us to meet 
the next morning." IcL at 95. The man was not present at the meeting time and place and 
Burke never again "heard from the person who is supposed to be Steven Doolittle." IcL 
at 96-97. Burke did not "have any idea whether or not [the man he spoke to was] 
actually Steven Doolittle." Id, at 112. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Written testimony is not documentary evidence to be given to the jury during 
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deliberation. If written testimony is given to the jury and prejudice results, the case 
should be reversed. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by sending the 
written statement into the jury room during deliberation. Further, this Court should 
reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial. 
First, the trial court abused its discretion by sending the written statement into the 
jury room during deliberation. Written testimony should not be taken into the jury room 
during deliberation. Otherwise, if some evidence is admitted in oral form only, while 
other evidence is first read and then delivered to the jury in writing, the side sustained by 
written evidence is given an undue advantage. Here, Leonhardt's trial testimony 
exonerated Doolittle and her written statement implicated him. Thus, by publishing the 
written statement, the trial court unduly promoted the State's case. This result does not 
change simply because the written statement was given to a police officer rather than in 
court. Regardless of the written statement's origin, its publication acted to unduly 
emphasize Leonhardt's written statement over her trial testimony. 
Second, this Court should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion was 
prejudicial. An error is prejudicial if the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence 
of the error is sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Here, the 
written statement was critical to the prosecution's case. Thus, had the trial court not 
placed undue emphasis on the written statement by publishing it to the jury and sending 
it with the jury into deliberation, there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would not have 
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found sufficient evidence to convict Doolittle. Further, the prejudicial nature of 
publishing the written statement was not mitigated by the admission of additional 
exculpatory evidence. Finally, the State's undue advantage was exacerbated by the 
cumulative presentation of the written statement during trial and the difficulty in 
discrediting the written statement through cross-examination. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENDING THE 
WRITTEN STATEMENT INTO THE JURY ROOM DURING 
DELIBERATION 
"A written instrument, made an exhibit in the cause but not consisting of 
testimony of a witness in the case, may of course be taken to the jury room the same as 
maps, diagrams, and other exhibits." State v. Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 
(Utah 1939). However, Utah's "well established rule" places "the testimony of a witness 
. . . in a different category." IcL Written testimony "'is not documentary evidence to be 
received in writing and given to the jury.'" State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 642 (Utah 
1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Solomon, 87 P.2d at 811). If written testimony is given 
to the jury and prejudice results, the case should be reversed. See_ Carter, 888 P.2d at 
643-44 (reviewing trial court's error in giving written testimony to jury for prejudicial 
harm). In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by sending the written statement 
into the jury room during deliberation. Further, this Court should reverse because the 
trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial. 
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A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Sending the Written Statement 
With the Jury into Deliberation, 
Written testimony "should not be admitted into evidence as an exhibit, nor should 
it be taken into the jury room during deliberation." Carter, 888 P.2d at 642. This rule 
was "always" followed by the common law. Solomon, 87 P.2d at 811. It is also 
"supported by [Utah's] own case law, as well as the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." 
Carter, 888 P.2d at 642 (citing Solomon, 87 P.2d at 811; State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14-
15 (Utah 1984)).2 Moreover, it is followed by other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. 
Jovenal, 573 P.2d 515, 516-18 (Az. Ct. App. 1977) (holding trial court erred by allowing 
"jury to take a transcript of [defendant's] testimony into the jury room" because "[c]ase 
law from other jurisdictions generally holds that it is improper to give the jury partial 
transcripts of the testimony, reasoning that undue emphasis is placed on the testimony 
2
 Formerly, rule 17(k) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure said. "Upon 
retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all 
exhibits and papers which have been received as evidence, except depositions." Carter , 
888 P.2d at 643 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 17(k) (1994)). While acknowledging this rule 
was "not directly on point," our supreme court held "rule 17(k) indicates that exhibits 
which are testimonial in nature should not be given to the jury during its deliberations." 
Carter, 888. P.2d at 643. Today, rule 17(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure says, 
"Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the court 
and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in 
the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, 
weapons, or contraband." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(1). According to the advisory note, 
reference to depositions was removed from the rule "not in order to permit the jurors to 
have depositions but to recognize that depositions are not evidence ." Utah R. Crim. P. 
17(1) Advisory Committee Note (emphasis added). Accordingly, the current language of 
rule 17(1) more clearly establishes our supreme court's inference that written testimony 
should "be treated as any other oral testimony." Id 
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thus made available in written form" (citations omitted)); State v. Wilson, 360 P.2d 1092, 
1098 (Kan. 1961) (holding trial court erred because "action of the trial court in sending 
the transcript of the evidence to the jury appears to be without precedent"); Schmunk v. 
State. 714 P.2d 724, 744 (Wyo. 1986) ("The rule against sending testimony to the jury 
room is as ancient as the common law itself."); Commonwealth v. Ware, 20 A. 806, 808 
(Pa. 1890) (holding the trial court did not err by refusing to send written testimony to the 
jury during deliberation because the "sending out of a part of the testimony to the jury 
room is without precedent, and would have been a palpable error"). 
Written testimony is excluded from jury deliberation because "[i]f some evidence 
is admitted in oral form only, while other evidence is first read and then delivered to the 
jury in writing, 'it is obvious that the side sustained by written evidence is given an 
undue advantage/" Carter. 888 P.2d at 642-43 (quoting Solomon. 87 P.2d at 811).3 "It 
3
 See also Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d at 744 ("The reason for the rule [against 
sending written testimony to the jury room] is obvious. Having some testimony to read 
again and consider and discuss in deliberations, the jury is likely to unduly emphasize 
that testimony over that which was heard days before and which may have begun to fade 
from memory."); Commonwealth v. Canales, 311 A.2d 572, 575 (Pa. 1973) (prohibiting 
written testimony from jury deliberation because "the presence in the jury room of the 
physical embodiment of a portion of the trial testimony in written form may have the 
effect of increasing the probability that the jury will accept that testimony as credible"); 
Pavne v. State. 227 N.W. 258, 263 (Wise. 1929) ("While it is held that the matter of 
permitting exhibits to be taken to the jury room is a matter resting within the discretion of 
the trial court, attention should be paid to the nature of the exhibits" because where "the 
testimony bearing on one side of a controversy is in the form of a deposition or other 
written statement, and the testimony on the other resting entirely on parol evidence given 
in the court, it is obvious that to permit a jury to take the written portion of the testimony 
to the jury room, compelling them to rely upon their memories for the testimony on the 
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may often happen that the testimony on one side is oral from witnesses produced before 
the jury, while the testimony for the other side on essential matters is in the form of 
depositions or in the transcript from testimony at a previous hearing." Solomon, 87 P.2d 
at 811 (citations omitted). "If the hearing lasts for any length of time and the jury takes 
the depositions or transcript to be read and discussed while the oral evidence contra has 
in a measure faded from the memory of the jurors, it is obvious that the side sustained by 
written evidence is given an undue advantage." Id. (citations omitted). In other words, 
"[t]he law does not permit depositions or witnesses to go to the jury room. Why should a 
witness be permitted to go there in the form of written testimony?" Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Here, the trial court abused its discretion by sending the written statement into the 
jury's deliberation. At trial, Leonhardt testified she did not know if Doolittle had 
borrowed her car on July 9, 2002, and did not talk to Doolittle about any incident that 
may have happened while he was driving her car. IdL at 26-27, 31, 37-38. Alternatively, 
in the written statement, Leonhardt said she did lend Doolittle her car and afterward 
Doolittle "might have mentioned almost getting pulled over by a cop." IcL_ at 29-30. The 
jury was presented both versions of Leonhardt's testimony and instructed to decide 
which version was true. R. 59; 92:26-30, 139-41. However, while the jury only heard 
other side, gives one side of the controversy an undue advantage, and it would seem 
plain that such exhibits should not be permitted to be taken to the jury room."). 
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Leonhardt's oral testimony once at the beginning of trial, the trial court allowed the jury 
to hear about the written statement many times throughout the trial, to look at the written 
statement during trial, and to take the written statement into deliberation. Id. at 26-30, 
42, 67-68, 155-56. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by placing undue 
emphasis on the written statement and giving the State an undue advantage by publishing 
the written statement to the jury and allowing the jury to read and consider the written 
statement during its deliberation. See Davis, 689 P.2d at 27-28 (holding trial court erred 
by sending deposition of "prior inconsistent statement" into deliberation). 
This result does not change simply because the written statement was given to a 
police officer rather than in court. See, e.g.. Pope v. State, 399 S.E.2d 552, 553 (Ga. 
1990) (holding error to send "transcript of defendant's tape-recorded conversation with a 
detective" into jury's deliberation); Stidemv. State, 272 S.E.2d 338, 340 (Ga. 1980) 
("All writings introduced in evidence in lieu of testimony from the witness stand, such as 
interrogatories, depositions, dying declarations, and confessions of guilt of a defendant 
or of an alleged coconspirator, which depend entirely for their value on the credibility of 
the maker, should not be in the possession of the jury during their deliberations." 
(citation omitted)); Proctor v. State, 221 S.E.2d 556, 558 (Ga. 1975) (holding "error 
committed in allowing" written statements "given by [witnesses]... to Detective [] on 
the day of the shooting" to go into jury's deliberation "would be harmless" because the 
statements were consistent with defense's theory); Dunn v. People, 50 N.E. 137, 138 (111. 
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1898) (holding error to send transcription of dying declaration into jury deliberation 
because delivering "the written statement to the jury so they might have it constantly 
before them during their deliberations, to operate on their sympathies as well as their 
memory, tended to give a manifest advantage to the People over the plaintiff in error, 
whose proof was but oral"); State v. Lord. 84 P.2d 80, 95 (N.M. 1938) (holding 
"manifest disadvantage to a defendant for an alleged confession to be delivered to the 
jury for consideration by them during their retirement" because it "might, and probably 
would, operate on and prejudice them as against the oral testimony in conflict therewith 
regarding which they could not refresh their memories"). 
In fact, the error of sending the written statement into jury deliberation was 
actually compounded by the written statement's status as a police report rather than trial 
testimony given under oath and subject to cross-examination. See State v. Bertul, 664 
P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Utah 1983) (holding police reports offered by the prosecution 
"should ordinarily be excluded" because they "are generally made for the purpose of 
successfully prosecuting a crime" and cannot be "effectively] cross-examin[ed]"). 
B. This Court Should Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion 
Was Prejudicial. 
An error is prejudicial if "the likelihood of a different outcome [in the absence of 
the error is] sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. 
Adams, 2000 UT 42^20, 5 P.3d 642 (alterations in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted). Whether the presence of written testimony in the jury room during deliberation 
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is harmless depends on numerous factors, including "the 
importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's 
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the 
testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of 
cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the 
overall strength of the prosecution's case." 
Carter, 888 P.2d at 644 (citations omitted). 
For example, in Solomon, the trial court allowed the State to read from a transcript 
of a prior hearing to impeach a witness. Solomon, 87 P.2d at 810. The trial court then 
allowed the jury to take the transcript into deliberation. IcL On appeal, our supreme 
court held "the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded" because it was "error 
to permit any part of the transcript used in impeaching the witnesses to be taken to the 
jury room in writing." IcL at 811. Conversely, in Carter, the trial court erred by 
permitting the jury to view during deliberation a transcript of "all testimony introduced 
by either party at the original guilt and sentencing proceedings." Carter, 888 P.2d at 636. 
However, our supreme court held this error was not prejudicial because the "dramatic 
impact" of the transcript came from reading it "into the record," and its admission into 
deliberation mitigated the dramatic impact by "providing] the jury with complete access 
to [the defendant's] original counsel's full cross-examination and any other evidence in 
mitigation" that was "not previously read into the record." IcL at 643-44. 
Here, the trial court's error in allowing the jury to take the written statement into 
deliberation was prejudicial. The written statement was critical to the prosecution's case 
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because it was the only direct evidence of Doolittle's guilt. See Canales, 311 A.2d at 575 
(holding trial court's error in submitting the notes an officer used to refresh his 
recollection to the jury was prejudicial because the officer's "testimony was critical to the 
prosecution"). Leonhardt's trial testimony exonerated Doolittle. R. 92:26-27, 31, 37-39. 
More important, Burke could not identify Doolittle as the driver of the vehicle or as the 
person he spoke to over the phone. Id_ at 69, 96-97, 110, 112. Although Burke spoke to 
someone on the phone, he never saw this person and could not identify the phone 
number he called as the one Leonhardt had given him. Id. at 96-97, 112. Accordingly, 
had the trial court not placed undue emphasis on the written statement by sending it with 
the jury into deliberation, there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would not have found 
sufficient evidence to convict Doolittle. See. State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 
(Utah 1989) ("The reasonable likelihood question is not just the substantial evidence test 
in disguise; rather, it focuses on the taint caused by the error. If the taint is sufficient, it 
is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict."); Wilson , 
360 P.2d at 1098 (holding trial court's error in sending transcript of alleged victim's 
testimony into jury deliberation was prejudicial because transcript "placed undue 
emphasis on [victim's] testimony; in fact, it was equivalent to sending the complaining 
witness into the jury room, where she continued to plead her cause"). 
This is especially true because the jury only took two pieces of evidence with 
them into deliberation: the written statement and Burke's drawing of the incident. R. 64. 
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Accordingly, there is no chance the written statement was lost amid stacks of evidence 
and never seen or reviewed by the jury. See State v. McRoberts, 346 N.W.2d 470 (Wise. 
Ct. App. 1984) (unpublished disposition) (holding, without deciding whether error 
existed, that publication of written statements was harmless because statements "were 
only three of over one hundred exhibits which went to the jury" and "were placed in 
random order before the jury received them to prevent any objection as to preferential 
treatment of one exhibit over another"). 
Further, unlike in Carter, the prejudicial nature of publishing the written statement 
was not mitigated by the presence of new exculpatory evidence in the statement. Id_ at 
29-30. The written statement completely contradicted Leonhardt's testimony and directly 
implicated Doolittle in the charged crimes. Id at 26-30, 31, 37-39, 69, 96-97, 110, 112. 
Finally, the State's undue advantage was exacerbated by the cumulative 
presentation of the written statement during trial and the difficulty in discrediting the 
written statement through cross-examination. First, although the jury heard Leonhardt's 
trial testimony exonerating Doolittle only once at the very beginning of trial, it heard the 
written statement implicating Doolittle repeatedly during trial and was permitted to view 
the written statement during trial before ever taking it into deliberation for further 
review. R. 92:26-30, 42, 67-68, 155-56. Second, unlike Leonhardt's trial testimony, 
which the State had ample opportunity to cross-examine, the written statement was 
difficult if not impossible to cross-examine because Leonhardt could not recall any 
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details in or behind the statement. Id. at 34-40, 43; see BertuL 664 P.2d at 1185 ("It 
would be 'error and ordinarily reversible error to receive an exhibit containing "a neat 
condensation of the government's whole case against the defendant"' in the form of a 
police report for which there can be no effective cross-examination" because the Utah 
Supreme Court "long ago fors[ook] the practice of allowing a person to be convicted on 
the basis of out-of-court statements, whether written or oral, of persons not subject to 
cross-examination" (citations omitted)); United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 117 (6th 
Cir. 1979) ("Under these circumstances, [where witness's prior statement was admitted 
because she could not longer recall incident], while [defendant] may have been 
physically confronted with the witnesses against him, cross-examination was, for all 
practical purposes, impossible."); People v. Yarbrough, 520 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (111. Ct. 
App. 1988) ("Obviously, a defendant cannot cross-examine a witness with respect to the 
truth or falsity of an out-of-court statement of which the witness has no memory."). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Doolittle's convictions because the trial court abused its 
discretion by sending the written statement into the jury room during deliberation. 
SUBMITTED this Jtu day of December, 2003. 
tZy& J. SEP 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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District Court Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
THE COURT 
evidence that , . • .. t , .*. .. : * 
i~tr the jury room, select a toropers* ! • iscu?? a»*. decide 
Thank "on .
 v.a^ tj . •, -i 
You ^av be seated. 
1 * -
c* ±-^~ presence w. \ ;.> jury. 
Counsel, the Court has read the materials gi ven In 





Yo . IK-IV ;:i-iKe whatever record you would like on all 
!' 
THE COURT: —of those matters. We're now oi it of 
the presence < :)f the ji iry— 
il-t COURT: --and you are invited— 
ROMERO 
ROMERC objected L. 
actui: 
sv i ience and being puoiishea a Ken oacK to th< 
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jury room. 
Is that supposed to go back to the jury room? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. ROMERO: Wasn't that illustrative, only? 
THE COURT: The—the exhibit was received, was it 
not? 
MS. ROMERO: Was it? Okay. 
THE CLERK: 2? 
THE COURT: No. I'm going to wait for just a minute 
on No. 2 
MS. ROMERO: Okay. All right. 
In any event, my—my objection was essentially this: 
That certainly, the State had the opportunity to question her 
about that prior statement, because she was present here 
today; but pursuant to the rule, and it's 803, Subsection 5, 
of recorded recollection, that actual statement itself could 
not be admitted into evidence as an exhibit. And the Court 
permitted it to come in and there is an advisory committee 
note to the Rules of Evidence that states that Utah Courts 
have sanctioned the admission of the record of a past 
recollection contra to this rule. 
And I found the case that was relied upon in that 
note and it's called Saaers vs. International Smelting 
Company, 50 Utah 423, 168 Pacific 105 from 1917. The Utah 
Rules of Evidence, I don't believe, were adopted actually 
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answers that issue for the Court. 
And then there's also a law review article and it's 
very lengthy, I only provided the Court with the first few 
pages as a result of the lengthiness of it. But there's a 
paragraph at the top of Page 2 that I've submitted to the 
Court that says a record of the witness' past recollection is 
not admitted as an exhibit lest it have extra impact by being 
physically present in the jury room rather than just another 
piece of oral testimony, instead, it may be read to the jury 
upon laying the proper foundation of the record is a reliable 
part of the matter stated. This is a departure from previous 
Utah practice allowing the document into evidence. The new 
rule satisfies the criteria for admissibility of past 
recollection recorded statements. 
And I think this article is entitled Utah Rules of 
Evidence, 1983, Part Three, and it's authored by Ronald Boyce 
and Edward (inaudible). 
I think that when we're talking about whether or not 
these particular records come in, I think that there's a lot 
of broad language that's used, and I think in that rule, they 
use some broad language to describe something that didn't 
necessarily mean that the document was being admitted into 
evidence as an exhibit. And I think that that's clarified by 
the article here. 
My major objection was the fact that the—not the 
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no objection to the Court retrieving it from the jury. 
MS. ROMERO: And Judge, that's not our only 
objection. That is part of it, certainly, but that's not the 
only part of it. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court has heard from 
both counsel. The Court believes that the statement is 
admissible. The Court has so ruled and if there is a question 
some time later, we'll let the appellate court review it. 
All right. 
MS. ROMERO: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, you both did a 
great job and the Court appreciates having you in Court. 
Let's give the jury a little while, I wouldn't go too far and 
make sure that we know how to reach you if you're not close. 
MS. ROMERO: Absolutely, and your Honor, I'm going 
to stay in the Court building, just for the Court's 
information. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. ROMERO: I may be downstairs in Judge Roth's 
court. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And we will give the 
jury some time. 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: You may be seated. 
In the matter of State of Utah vs. Steven J. 
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